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 Book Reviews
Questioning Morals and Moral Questions in Organizations: Review
and Response
Memory as a Moral Decision: The Role of Ethics in Organizational
Culture, Steven P. Feldman. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2004. 249
pp. $29.95, ISBN 0765805863 (pbk)
Steven Feldman’s introduction is prefaced by a short remark from William
James extolling the importance of prayer to the establishing of a self that is
responsible to the ‘higher tribunals’. From there on it becomes increasingly
clear that Feldman’s task is to direct us toward such higher tribunals. In the
preface Feldman advises us that he establishes a theory of moral tradition,
designed to investigate the historical and cultural context of moral commit-
ment. It should be clear that this is theorizing with definite auspices: the
religious beliefs that Feldman ‘professes’ (and Weber’s caustic remarks on
the professing of religion in his essay ‘Science as a Vocation’ are, I think,
worth recalling here) are as central to the enterprise as they are absent. They
are central in the grounding of the book as a moral project while they are
absent because they are never spelled out clearly as a set of specific
commitments.
Feldman’s moral project addresses the disjuncture between the individual
and the collective consciousness. In organization terms, it addresses the
troubled cultural links connecting conceptions of free individuals and con-
straining organizations. There is a world we have lost in which collective
memory of the past disciplined projects for the future, in which guilt played
a central role, serving to index cultural unity, coherence, closure and conti-
nuity. Feldman asserts that these are the properties that are missing not only
in modernity but also in contemporary organization theories. In other words,
what he advocates amounts to a nostalgic, religious functionalism. Moral life
is essentially a religiously disciplined activity: it is expressed both through
repression and ambivalence; the normative sources of its order are embedded
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in culture; they are transmitted through central values, inducted through
socialization, and represented symbolically in what cultural authority per-
mits and prohibits.
Tradition is singular—a living culture, a monad, stressing continuity,
harmony and authority. Tradition is antithetical to business schools where
the emphasis is on change and innovation rather than continuity. Hence, by
their nature, Feldman argues, business schools undermine the ethical bases
of professional practice. ‘The moral treasures of our defining traditions are
being lost through an indifference to the past and what it has to offer’ (p. 29).
God has been replaced by Rationalism.
Part 2 of the book traces these themes to Barnard and Dalton. The Prophet
of the Cult of Rationalism in Organization Theory is Chester Barnard, who
installs executives as the cult’s chaplains. Dalton releases managers from any
obligation to heed moral ‘sermons’; lacking a moral compass, at best Dalton’s
‘men who manage’ can only aspire to be efficient nihilists in the com-
promises they make, remembering nothing other than expedience.
In Part 3 we meet two new sets of moral failures. First are critical
organization theorists, who remember only that they distrust the past and
hope for the future as a place where social construction can be emancipatory
rather than constraining. Like radical Quakers, they would abandon all
claims to a priestly caste and remake traditions inherited from the past—like
a dead weight on the brains of the living, to borrow a memorable phrase from
Marx—with a creed based only on participation and the bearing of witness
through resistance. Criticism, not commitment, and freedom from control by
any hierarchy—these are seen to be the watchwords of critical organization
theorists.
Second in line for condemnation by Feldman in Part 3 are institutional
theorists with their celebration of mimesis based on tradition. If Feldman had
examined a wider range of institutional studies, he might have appreciated
its conservatism. As it is, however, his focus is on Vaughan’s study of the
Challenger disaster, in which mimesis was all too clearly coercive. Real
traditions, he maintains, seduce with their ritual and certainties—they do not
require coercion to press-gang their members. Hence, a culture arose that
stressed passivity and fear.
Part 4 switches focus to ethical relativism. First for the critical axe is
Foucault and those he inspired. At issue is their destruction of ‘the idea of
what the sacred signifies: a deeply personal commitment to faith in revealed
truth’ (p. 139). The phrase is revealing: it allows the idea of tradition that
informs the work to be glimpsed as something normally confined to the
pulpit. The ‘truth/knowledge’ offered by ‘time-honored organizational tradi-
tions’ (p. 148) that stress continuity is preferred to the emancipation of
relativistic accounts of power/knowledge, accounts that forget, or perhaps
never properly knew, their history. If they did, he argues, they would realize
that the Enlightenment was an attack on traditional authority, not authority
per se, and thus that belief can be positive. Indeed, against the Enlightenment
attack, Feldman would reinstate the centrality of tradition for organizations
in general, not just the Christian church. Well, this hardly resolves the moral
issues, unfortunately: obeisance to tradition is an insufficient guarantee of
morality without some inquiry into the content of the tradition, what it
includes, condones, excludes and attacks. Plenty of unsavoury organizational
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traditions are associated with ‘Christian humility’ (p. 151). Being Christian
and having humility, historically, has been no antidote to launching barba-
rism, militarism, and nationalism. (Readers may think of manifestations of
these traits from their preferred political leaders. There are many contenders
in the English-speaking world at the time of writing.) The usefulness of
tradition, suggests Feldman, is its historical anchoring of organizational
culture and symbolism. Through these we can establish ‘the hairline differ-
ence between legitimate authority and power, a difference completely lost in
Foucault-inspired organization theory’ (p. 152).
In a discussion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s gulag, we are asked, ‘[Are] the
similarities between employees and prisoners in democratic societies more
important than the differences? I think not. One must forget the prisoner’s
guilt to think it so.’ Guilt, however, is an effect of judicial processes, not a
state of being. To assume that an absolute moral authority marks the outcome
of judicial processes is most peculiar—especially in the context of the gulag.
It reminds me of early histories of Australia that spoke pejoratively of the
‘convict stain’ on our identity, due to our continent’s having been initially
settled by the excess population of a harsh penal system—in the world’s first
gulag. Guilt means nothing other than the organizational mechanisms that
produce it. Still, to paraphrase Bob Dylan, if you’ve got God on your side,
then no worries:
. . . faith is not even conceived of as a possibility in the modern-postmodern debate
between realism and relativism . . . postmodernism must repress the idea of faith,
because the mere idea of being beyond doubt is contradictory to the postmodern
vision of cultural ‘openness’ . . . belief can be doubted: Faith cannot. (p. 162)
What is needed, we are subsequently advised, is
. . . a counter-enlightenment that resurrects the capacity of individuals, organiza-
tions, and societies to commit themselves to collective standards of moral order and
thereby reduce the scourge of criticism to a secondary tool of refinement rather than
a substitute for moral culture itself. (p. 178)
We need to be committed Christians, believers in resurrection, if we are to be
capable of good business ethics because we must believe in divine revelation
and retribution—only faith can keep us pure—although criticism may be a
useful occasional scourge.
Readers may find the call for counter-Enlightenment somewhat surprising,
and Feldman concedes that it looks unlikely. Instead, a surprising repository
of tradition is posited in one short paragraph: ‘I see no other possibility than
the universities . . . The moral leadership must come from the universities.’
The actually existing and hugely variable organizational conditions of exist-
ence in ‘the universities’ are not even glossed. If one desires passionate
invocation against much past and present organization theory, while requir-
ing pieties and moral certainties clothed in analytical sophistication, this is
the book for you.
Stewart Clegg
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia and Aston Business School,
UK
Organization 12(1)
Reviews
137
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011org.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Response to Clegg
In Death of a Salesman by Arthur Miller (1958), the main character Willie
Loman (pronounced Low Man) kills himself by automobile. The story
teaches that modern capitalism is related to organization man’s self-hatred.
Willie Low Man is empty, void of moral character. When materialistic
supports and status achievements fall away, Willie (standing in for modern
man/woman) has no internal resources left to bear the loss and is compelled
to kill himself for the insurance money in one last stab at ‘success’.
Professor Clegg reviews my book Memory as a Moral Decision as if Low
Man’s loss of moral memory is not a problem in modern organizations.
Indeed, Clegg sees man/woman’s internality only in terms of the external;
more exactly, he sees the idea of the moral soul as an unfortunate fraud
created by religious and cultural imperialists intent on gaining political
power inside-out through mind control. This reduction of ethics to politics
is a defining feature of modern culture: when belief in cultural ideals
became passe´, man/woman was left free of their repressive weight; the
inevitable result was that all cultural ideals came to be seen as arbitrary
constructions of power. But when we rid ourselves of cultural ideals, we are
left with Low Man, not the inherent innocence of the free individual or the
shared ideals of democratic citizens. Low Man (imagine Kozlowski or
Skilling) tends to steal without end and uses the democratic process as just
another pork belly upon which to feed not only his materialism but his
insatiable ego as well.
In Memory as a Moral Decision I argue that cultural shallowness is the
central problem in modern organizations and nowhere are the consequences
as devastating as in moral character. Moral character changes over time, but
if it changes too quickly it has no credibility in the minds of others or in
one’s own. Hence, the way an individual, group, organization, community,
or society experiences its moral commitments over time is a measure of its
moral integrity. Does it maintain, improve, and transmit its moral values to
new members establishing a moral identity without which it cannot even
mount a moral opinion, let alone participate in moral decisions? Or does it,
like Kafka’s (1971) man of the mere present, find itself morally immobilized
between the contradictory forces of the past and future? I argue in Memory
as a Moral Decision that our relationship to the past is key in providing the
moral traditions that help us grasp those future possibilities which are part
of our historical context. This is our moral starting point and provides us
with the capacities for moral reflection and moral judgement and from
which we develop morally as persons. These traditions are anything but
singular. They can be more accurately described as ‘continuities of conflict’
(MacIntyre, 1984: 222) where overlapping, but inconsistent and contra-
dictory ideas and ideals represent an ongoing argument about what is right
and good.
Religion is a voice in these debates and part of our historical context.
Clegg’s caricature of my respect for Christian social ethics reflects his
seemingly complete rejection of religious moral teaching, not my position on
the relation between Christianity and professional ethics. I do not argue for
specific moral positions, but argue for the importance of the chain of moral
memory as a context for moral deliberation. Clegg criticizes me both for being
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unclear about what moral values I am promulgating and for promulgating
Christianity. His statements seem to contradict each other, but for Clegg they
are the same thing. He is frustrated that I argue for the importance of moral
commitment without stating my own, so he (wildly) assumes anyone who
writes positively about ‘truth/knowledge’ or ‘faith’ must be advocating Chris-
tian belief. He insists on discovering (projecting) ‘my’ moral commitments so
he has a target to attack. This is the critical intellect: it ‘finds’ itself only in
attacking something else. This interminable dissection is the essence of
modern/postmodern culture. In my book I attempt to find a way out of this
endless transition by remembering the role moral traditions played in social
life before man/woman decided Reason—constructive or deconstructive—
was all that was needed to create the perfect world now. Knowledge of
tragedy and the trade-offs we all must bear as part of being human were
devalued along with the moral traditions that addressed these painful real-
ities. I do not advocate a rejection of rationalism and individualism, but a
check on them by strengthening moral memory. I reject radical criticism in all
its forms as the answer to excessive rationalism.
It is difficult to see what kind of internal life the critical project in any of its
forms seeks. Clegg writes:
Guilt, however, is an effect of judicial processes, not a state of being. To assume that
an absolute moral authority marks the outcome of judicial processes is most
peculiar . . . Guilt means nothing other than the organizational mechanisms that
produce it.
Legal guilt is the result of judicial processes; psychological guilt and social
guilt are not. Clegg reduces the sociology of law to the mechanisms of power.
But a social organization that was reduced to relations of power would be no
more than what Hobbes described as the war of all against all. Even in the
United States, where competitive forces overcome civilized relations all too
often, truthfulness, courage, and justice can be found in everyday life.
Indeed, even Enron produced whistleblowers. Social organization cannot
exist without moral practice based on shared (and enduring) moral values.
These values are internalized in the process of socialization. When we violate
these values we experience guilt. Guilt is a state of being. It reflects one part
of the mind condemning another for violating its own internalized standards.
Critical theory as practiced in organization studies has a simplistic view of
the human soul (which Plato characterized as containing ‘a little human, a
lion, and a many-headed, shape changing beast’ (Annas, 1999: 135)), if it
finds one at all.
Even law reflects more than mechanisms of power; it involves cultural
values and conscience. Cultural values cannot be reduced to power relations
because they have a partly autonomous history. Whistleblowers most often
wind up worse off but speak out from conscience nonetheless. To call these
cases acts of power misrepresents the memory of moral values, crisis of
conscience, and struggles with guilt inherent in moral whistleblowing.
Critical organization theory has much work ahead to do justice to the chain of
moral memory, the complexity of the human soul, and how both complicate
the simplistic reduction of all human experience to externalized relations of
power.
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Making Sense of Change
Making Sense of Organizational Change, Jean Helms Mills, foreword by
Jean Bartunek. London: Routledge, 2003. 256 pp. £23.99, ISBN
0415369398 (pbk)
This interesting text offers a longitudinal analysis of change management
processes in Novia Scotia Power, a Canadian electricity generator and sup-
plier that was, in common with a number of European utilities, privatized
during a period of economic and political management that the author
characterizes as the Reagan–Thatcher era. In offering this analysis the book
also offers a critical review of the academic field concerned with change
management and a critical appraisal of the activities of management consult-
ing organizations and their (often) universalistic and prescriptive approaches
to the problems of organization and change. Mounting this attack on the
theory and practice of change, the author calls upon a critical reading of
Weick’s account(s) of sensemaking in organizations.
Fittingly for a book concerned with such an analytical approach, the text
itself is clearly meant to be read as a product of the author’s own sense-
making processes. Indeed we are informed that the narrative of changing
presented in the text was developed from research that employed a ‘groun-
ded theory’ approach—although we should note that, for some at least, this
fact will cast a long shadow over the analysis. In addition it is worth noting
that the text also demonstrates sensemaking processes on a more personal
level insofar as it seems to recount the author’s own conversion from
‘orthodox’ consultant (and servant of power?) to critical, academic, com-
mentator. This rounded approach to sensemaking gives the text a multi-
layered concern with politics, organization and identity and ensures that
Helms Mills’s analysis adds to our appreciation of change management (a) as
an organizational activity that is shaping and reshaping all our lives and (b)
as a field of academic inquiry that structures our understanding of such
organizational processes—although not always for the best.
Yet despite this general endorsement and despite the supporting commen-
tary of Karl Weick, which appears on the back cover, I do have reservations
regarding certain aspects of the argument and analysis. Acknowledging
Helms Mills’s impatience with linear modelling, I will nonetheless enumer-
ate my concerns:
(1) The text, we are told, is based upon a longitudinal study that benefited
from unique and privileged access both to organizational members and to
company documentation. Yet despite this promise of analytical depth, Helms
Mills’s narrative is not especially rich. Indeed the text struggles to narrate the
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